Alibi Notice Rules: The Preclusion Sanction as Procedural Default by Irish, Lori Ann
Alibi Notice Rules: The Preclusion Sanction
as Procedural Default
During the 1920's the alibi defense1 in criminal trials became a
target of criticism as "one of the main avenues for escape of the
guilty."2 Alibi defenses were perceived as providing a means for
defendants to surprise and outmaneuver prosecutors unprepared
for evidence that the accused was elsewhere when the crime oc-
curred.$ Perhaps in response to this criticism, forty-one states have
promulgated rules requiring defendants to provide notice of an al-
ibi defense sufficiently in advance of trial to permit prosecutors to
investigate the alibi;" in 1975, an alibi notice rule was added to the
1 "Alibi" literally means "elsewhere." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTION-
ARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 53 (unabr. ed. 1976). A defendant who pleads an alibi must
state that, at the time the crime was committed, he was at some specific place other than
the place of the crime, a place so distant that it would have been impossible for him to
travel to the scene of the crime. See, e.g., People v. Terrell, 138 Cal. App. 2d 35, 52-53, 291
P.2d 155, 166 (1955) (different room in same office not enough).
2 Millar, The Modernization of Criminal Procedure, 11 J. Cram. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 344,
350 (1920). Alibi defenses were singled out perhaps because they are the quintessential "hip
pocket" defense, easily manufactured for introduction in the final hours of trial. See Ep-
stein, Advance Notice of Alibi, 55 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 29, 31 (1964).
Such a manufactured alibi defense can be used to raise a reasonable doubt in the minds of
the jurors. Because the prosecutor has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, even
the slightest amount of alibi evidence may have a decisive impact on the case. See Flatten &
Watkins, Proposed: That Texas Adopt a Statute Giving the Prosecution the Right of Pre-
Trial Notice of the Defense of Alibi, 14 S. Tax. L.J. 1, 13-16 (1973) (arguing that an alibi
notice rule leaves the defense intact for the defendant to interpose, but eliminates the abuse
of fabrication).
3 Surprise is far more likely in criminal than in civil trials because criminal discovery is
comparatively limited. A defendant's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination
effectively bars much discovery by the prosecution, cf. United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646,
649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923) (L. Hand, J.) (discussing general procedural advantages of defendants
in context of advocating absolute ban on discovery by criminal defendants), and the Su-
preme Court has repeatedly held that a criminal defendant has no constitutional right to
discovery, see, e.g., Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977). A number of critics
have suggested that defendants should be allowed limited discovery, see, e.g., Flannery, The
Prosecutor's Case Against Liberal Discovery, 33 F.R.D. 74, 78-79 (1963) (arguing that al-
lowing liberal discovery, similar to that found in civil proceedings, to defendants is unfair to
prosecutors and tempts defendants to bribe or threaten prosecution witnesses or commit
perjury); but see, e.g., Pye, The Defendant's Case for More Liberal Discovery, 33 F.R.D. 82,
83 (1963) (arguing, for instance, that a defendant cannot prepare a defense unless informed
of the government's case), and this position has generally held the field, see, e.g., FED. R.
CrIM. P. 16; ILL. Sup. CT. R. 412, 413; WIs. R. CraM. P. 971.23-971.25.
' See infra Appendix. An alibi notice rule appeared in Scotland as early as 1887. Ep-
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Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The current federal Rule and the state alibi notice rules all
require a defendant who intends to present an alibi defense to in-
form the prosecutor of that intention at some specified date before
trial and to provide a list of alibi witnesses he intends to call.
Under most alibi notice rules, a defendant's failure to give timely
pretrial notice of an alibi defense may result in the exclusion of the
defendant's alibi evidence at trial.7
The United States Supreme Court has sustained the constitu-
tionality of alibi notice rules in general, holding that a requirement
of notice by defendants does not violate the fifth amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination." The Court has explicitly reserved
judgment, however, on the constitutionality of the exclusion of al-
ibi evidence as a sanction for noncompliance with the alibi notice
rule.' In Alicea v. Gagnon, e the Seventh Circuit ruled that this
exclusion, sometimes called the preclusion sanction," in a Wiscon-
sin alibi notice statute12 was a denial of the defendant's constitu-
stein, supra note 2, at 29.
5 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Amendments Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-64, §
3(13), 89 Stat. 370, 372-73 (codified at FED. R. CiM. P. 12.1).
' Most jurisdictions also provide for other limited forms of criminal discovery, see
supra note 3, but only those rules specifically addressing the discovery of alibi information
are analyzed here.
7See, e.g., ILL. Sup. CT. R. 413(d), 415(g)(i). Of the 41 states which have some form of
alibi notice rule, 17 states, including Illinois, allow both the defendant's own alibi testimony
as well as his witnesses' testimony to be excluded. Twenty-four states protect the defen-
dant's testimony from exclusion, but allow the defendant's witnesses' testimony to be ex-
cluded if the defendant has not complied with the rule. See infra Appendix.
8 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 80-86 (1970). The Court has held that due process
imposes a duty on prosecutors to provide reciprocal alibi discovery to the defendants.
Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 472 n.4 (1973).
9 Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 472 n.4 (1973); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 83
n.14 (1970); see also Taliaferro v. Maryland, 103 S. Ct. 2114, 2114-15 (1983) (White, J.,
joined by Brennan & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (certiorari should
be granted to consider whether use of the preclusion sanction to exclude the testimony of
defendant's sole alibi witness violated his right to offer witnesses as guaranteed by the sixth
amendment).
10 675 F.2d 913 (7th Cir. 1982).
11 The term "preclusion sanction" appears to have been used first in Note, The Preclu-
sion Sanction-A Violation of the Constitutional Right to Present a Defense, 81 YALE L.J.
1342 (1972).
Wis. R. CRIM. P. 971.23(8). The rule provides:
Notice of alibi. (a) If the defendant intends to rely upon an alibi as a defense, the
defendant shall give notice to the district attorney at the arraignment or at least 15
days before trial stating particularly the place where the defendant claims to have been
when the crime is alleged to have been committed together with the names and ad-
dresses of witnesses to the alibi, if known. If at the close of the state's case the defen-
dant withdraws the alibi or if at the close of the defendant's case the defendant does
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tional right to testify in his own behalf.13 The court endorsed the
theory that Wisconsin's interest in truthful alibis and more effi-
cient trials is not sufficient to justify a denial of the accused's right
to present a defense.14
This comment suggests that the preclusion sanction is not a
denial of a constitutional right but merely the consequence of a
defendant's failure to assert the constitutional right at the appro-
priate point in the litigation. Part I provides an overview of the
alibi notice rules in effect in state and federal courts. Part II re-
views the constitutional justifications for both the alibi notice rule
and the preclusion sanction, and outlines the sixth amendment
challenges to the sanction. Part III defends the sanction. Its analy-
sis balances the cost to the defendant of providing pretrial alibi
notice against the benefits that notice affords the criminal justice
system. Because the defendant's compliance costs are low and the
benefits to the criminal justice system are great, it is appropriate
to require pretrial notice as a condition to asserting the right to
present an alibi defense. By failing to assert that right at the ap-
propriate time, the defendant forfeits the right; the sanction oper-
ates merely to enforce the forfeiture. Moreover, as Part III demon-
strates, none of the alternative sanctions proposed by critics of the
preclusion sanction would enforce the alibi notice rule effectively.
Because procedural rules that permit such forfeiture are acceptable
not call some or any of the alibi witnesses, the state shall not comment on the defen-
dant's withdrawal or on the failure to call some or any of the alibi witnesses. The state
shall not call any alibi witnesses not called by the defendant for the purpose of im-
peaching the defendant's credibility with regard to the alibi notice. Nothing in this
section may prohibit the state from calling said alibi witnesses for any other purpose.
(b) In default of such notice, no evidence of the alibi shall be received unless the
court, for cause, orders otherwise.
(c) The court may enlarge the time for filing a notice of alibi as provided in par. (a)
for cause.
(d) Within 10 days after receipt of the notice of alibi, or such other time as the
court orders, the district attorney shall furnish the defendant notice in writing of the
names and addresses, if known, of any witnesses whom the state proposes to offer in
rebuttal to discredit the defendant's alibi. In default of such notice, no rebuttal evi-
dence on the alibi issue shall be received unless the court, for cause, orders otherwise.
The Wisconsin rule is similar to most other state rules. See infra Appendix.
13 The Alicea court, in a thorough analysis discussed in greater detail infra notes 79-95
and accompanying text, held that the fifth, sixth, and fourteenth amendments provided the
basis for the right to testify in one's own behalf. 675 F.2d at 923. The court acknowledged
that the Supreme Court has never explicitly held that such a right exists, id. at 920, but
cited dicta from several Supreme Court opinions as supporting its conclusions and found
that the majority of the lower federal courts which have considered the question have con-
cluded that such a right exists, id. at 920-23.
14 Id. at 923-25.
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only when the defendant's compliance costs are low, Part IV dis-
cusses three proposals for reducing the compliance costs of the al-
ibi notice rule.
I. FEDERAL AND STATE ALIBI NOTICE RULES
Rule 12.1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is the
product of a thirty-year debate. In 1943, the Preliminary Draft of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure included an alibi notice
rule.15 Because the Advisory Committees was divided on whether
the prosecutor or defendant should initiate the alibi notice process,
two versions of the rule were proposed to the Supreme Court with
the 1944 Second Preliminary Draft.1 7 The Supreme Court eventu-
ally rejected both."' In 1962 an alibi notice rule was again proposed
by the Advisory Committee, 9 but it died in a controversy over its
constitutionality and general fairness. 20 It was not until 1975 that
the Supreme Court and then Congress approved an alibi notice
rule.21
15 ADVISORY COMMiTrEE ON RULES OF CmMN PROCEDURE, FEDERAL RuLEs OF CRIM-
NAL PROCEDURE: PRELIMINARY DRAr 88 (1943).
16 The rules of practice and procedure in the federal courts, including the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, are under constant study by Advisory Committees appointed, pursu-
ant to 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1982), by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court through the Judi-
cial Conference of the United States.
" See FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1 advisory committee note, recounting the history of the
1943 and 1944 drafts. The 1944 draft required the defendant to initiate the process by mov-
ing the courts to require the government to state with greater particularity the time and
place on which it would rely; once the defendant was given this information he was required
to give notice of alibi. A minority submitted an alternative proposal to the Supreme Court
requiring the prosecutor to initiate the process.
18 See Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 327 U.S. 821 (1945) (final version of the
new rules that did not include any of the alibi notice rules proposed to the Court); Proposed
Amendments to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United States District
Courts, 62 F.R.D. 271, 293 advisory committee note (1974) (Advisory Committee speculates
that the unresolved difference of opinion "probably caused" the Court to reject both
rules) [hereinafter cited as 1974 Proposed Rules]; see also Epstein, supra note 2, at 30.
19 See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments: Rules of Criminal Procedure for
the United States District Courts, 31 F.R.D. 665, 673-74 (1962) (proposed Rule 12A & advi-
sory committee note).
20 1974 Proposed Rules, supra note 18, at 293 (proposed Rule 12.1 advisory committee
note). When the 1962 proposal was made, critics asserted that despite the widespread ap-
proval by state courts of alibi notice rules "such a notice invaded the fifth amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination and was fundamentally unfair to defendants." Everett, Dis-
covery in Criminal Cases-In Search of a Standard, 1964 DuKE L.J. 477, 497. The fear of a
fifth amendment violation proved to be unfounded. See infra notes 39-46 and accompanying
text (discussing Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970)). Critics also expressed concern that
intensive government investigation following notice of an alibi would discourage witnesses
from volunteering information. Everett, supra, at 498.
21 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Amendments Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-64, §§
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Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12.1 requires the prosecu-
tor, if he wishes to trigger the alibi notice rule, to make a written
demand of the defendant concerning any alibi defense and to state
the time, date, and place at which the offense was committed.22
The prosecutor is required to reciprocate by releasing alibi rebuttal
information. 23 The defendant and prosecutor are both under a con-
tinuing duty to provide the names and addresses of witnesses that
they intend to rely on to establish the defendant's location at the
time the crime was committed.24 If either party fails to comply
with the rule, the judge may exclude the testimony of any alibi or
2, 3(13), 89 Stat. 370, 370, 372-73 (codified at FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1). The 1974 Supreme
Court orders promulgating the 1975 rules are reprinted at FEDERAL RULES 10-11 (West
1981).
22 (a) Notice by Defendant. Upon written demand of the attorney for the government
stating the time, date, and place at which the alleged offense was committed, the de-
fendant shall serve within ten days, or at such different time as the court may direct,
upon the attorney for the government a written notice of his intention to offer a de-
fense of alibi. Such notice by the defendant shall state the specific place or places at
which the defendant claims to have been at the time of the alleged offense and the
names and addresses of the witnesses upon whom he intends to rely to establish such
alibi.
FED. R. CraM. P. 12.1(a).
Initiation by the prosecutor is essential; one court has held that a defendant's voluntary
offer of his alibi witnesses cannot substitute for the government's demand, and hence does
not trigger the prosecutor's reciprocal duty to disclose alibi information as provided by FED.
R. CRiM. P. 12.1(b), quoted infra note 23. United States v. Benton, 637 F.2d 1052, 1058-59
(5th Cir. 1981).
While rule 12.1 as originally proposed by the Supreme Court required the defendant to
initiate the process by informing the prosecutor of his intention to rely on an alibi defense,
see 1974 Proposed Rules, supra note 18, at 292 (Proposed Rule 12.1(a) begins: "If a defen-
dant intends to rely on the defense of alibi, he shall. . . notify the attorney for the govern-
ment . . . ."), the House of Representatives created the "prosecution-triggered" process
currently in effect, H.R. 6799, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1975); see H.R. REP. No. 247, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 674, 680-81. The
House Committee on the Judiciary reasoned that because the prosecutor benefits from the
rule, the government should bear the initial procedural burden. H.R. REP. No. 247, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 680-81.
23 (b) Disclosure of Information and Witness. Within ten days thereafter, but in no
event less than ten days before trial, unless the court otherwise directs, the attorney for
the government shall serve upon the defendant or his attorney a written notice stating
the names and addresses of the witnesses upon whom the government intends to rely
to establish the defendant's presence at the scene of the alleged offense and any other
witnesses to be relied on to rebut testimony of any of the defendant's alibi witness.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1(b)
24 (c) Continuing Duty to Disclose. If prior to or during trial, a party learns of an addi-
tional witness whose identity, if known, should have been included in the information
furnished under subdivision (a) or (b), the party shall promptly notify the other party
or his attorney of the existence and identity of such additional witness.
FED. R. CraM. P. 12.1(c).
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alibi-rebuttal witness except the defendant.2 For good cause
shown, the trial judge may grant an exemption from any of the
above rules.26 Finally, rule 12.1 renders inadmissible at trial evi-
dence of the defendant's intention, as indicated by pretrial notice,
to rely upon an alibi that is never actually presented.27
Alibi notice rules sharing many of the elements of the federal
rule are in effect in forty-one states and the District of Columbia.2
The remaining nine states have no alibi notice rules.29 In twenty-
four of the states with alibi notice rules and in the District of Co-
lumbia, the prosecutor must initiate the process by requesting alibi
information from the defendant;30 the remaining seventeen states'
25 (d) Failure to Comply. Upon the failure of either party to comply with the require-
ments of this rule, the court may exclude the testimony of any undisclosed witness
offered by such party as to the defendant's absence from or presence at, the scene of
the alleged offense. This rule shall not limit the right of the defendant to testify in his
own behalf.
FED. R. CriM. P. 12.1(d).
26 (e) Exceptions. For good cause shown, the court may grant an exception to any of the
requirements of subdivisions (a) through (d) of this rule.
FED. R. CriM. P. 12.1(e). The problem of defining "good cause shown" is considered infra
notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
17 (f) Inadmissibility of Withdrawn Alibi. Evidence of an intention to rely upon an alibi
defense, later withdrawn, or of statements made in connection with such intention, is
not admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding against the person who gave notice of
the intention.
FED. R. CRim. P. 12.1(0.
11 See infra Appendix; see also Taliaferro v. State, 295 Md. 376, 386-88 & nn.9-14, 456
A.2d 29, 35-36 & nn.9-14, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2114 (1983) (collection and discussion of
state alibi notice rules); cf. Epstein, supra note 2, at 36 app. a (1964 Field Survey Question-
naire and Reponses from Prosecutors in Jurisdictions with Rules Requiring Advance Notice
of Alibi); ADvIsoRY COMMIT= ON THE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 15, at 96-
97 (1947 survey of state court alibi notice rules).
29 The states without alibi notice rules are Alabama, Alaska, California, Delaware,
Georgia, Kentucky, Nebraska, North Carolina, and Texas. See letters from these states' De-
partments of Justice (on file at The University of Chicago Law Review); see also McGuff v.
State, 49 Ala. App. 88, 91-2, 268 So. 2d 868, 871 (1972), cert. denied, 289 Ala. 746, 268 So.
2d 877 (1972) (confirming that Alabama does not have an alibi notice rule). At least one
state attempts to provide liberal protection of the prosecution against surprise from an un-
anticipated alibi defense despite the absence of an alibi notice rule by authorizing continu-
ances whenever a defendant's witness presents alibi testimony. The rule also provides that if
only the defendant's testimony is at issue, the continuance shall not exceed one day. See
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1051 (West 1984). The original version of the statute was directed spe-
cifically to alibi witnesses. See An Act to Add Section 1051 to the Penal Code, Relating to
Criminal Procedure, ch. 551, § 1, 1980 Cal. Stat. 1534, amended by An Act to Amend Sec-
tion 1051 of, and Add Section 1102.5 to, the Penal Code, Relating to Discovery, ch. 1249, §
1, 1982 Cal. Stat. 6688, amended by An Act to Amend Section 1051 of the Penal Code,
Relating to Discovery, ch. 782, § 1, 1983 Cal. Stat. 4268. The 1982 amendment broadened
the rule to include all defense witnesses, and the 1983 amendment limited the continuance
for a defendant's testimony to one day.
10 See ARK. R. Cman. P. 18.3; COLO. R. CriM. P. 12.1; CONN. SUPER. CT. R. §§ 762-767;
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rules require the accused to raise the alibi issue during the pretrial
period."1 In most states, preclusion of alibi or alibi-rebuttal evi-
dence is the sole sanction for failure by either the accused or the
prosecutor to adhere to the notice requirement.3 2 Twenty-three of
those states except the defendant's own alibi testimony, either ex-
plicitly by statute"3 or by judicial interpretation. 4 A. number of
state rules permit alternate sanctions,3 5 most commonly continu-
ances to permit further investigation by the opposing party 6 and
contempt for willful violation of the rule.3 7 In every state the exer-
cise of any sanction is at the discretion of the trial court.38
D.C.R. CraM. P. 12.1; FLA. R. CraM. P. 3.200; IDAHO CODE § 19-519(1) (1979); ILL. SUP. CT. R.
413(d); LA. CODE CRiM. PRoc. ANN. art. 727(A) (West 1981); ME. R. CRIM P. 16A(b); MD.
ANN. CODE 9B Rule 741(d)(3); MAss. R. Cra. P. 14(b)(1)(A); MINN. R. CRaiM. P. 9.03-.03;
MISS. UNIFORM CIR. CT. R. 4.07; Mo. R. CrIM. P. 25.05(A)(5); N.J.R. CraM. PRAC. 3:11-1;
N.M.R. CRIM. P. 32(a); N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 250.20(1) (McKinney 1982); R.I.R. CRIM. P.
16(c) (if defendant requests discovery); S.C.R. OF PRACTICE IN CIR. CT. 103(e)(1); S.D. CODI-
FiED LAWS ANN. § 23A-9-1 (1979) (Rule 12.1(a)); TENN. R. CaiM. P. 12.1(a); VA. Sup. CT. R.
3A:14(c)(2) (if defendant requests discovery); WASH. R. CRIM. P. 4.7(b)(2); W. VA. R. CRIM.
P. 12.1(a); Wyo. R. CRIM. P. 16.1(a).
31 See ARiz. R. CRIM. P. 15.2(b); HAWAII R. PENAL P. 12.1(a); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-4-
1 (Burns 1983); IOWA R. CiuM. P. 10(lla); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3218(1) (1981); MICH. Comp.
LAWS ANN. § 768.20(1) (West 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-15-301(2) (1983); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 174.087(1) (1981); N.D.R. CRiM. P. 12.1(a); N.H. SUPER CT. R. 100; OHIO R. CraM. P.
12.1; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 585 (West 1969); OR. REV. STAT. § 135.455 (1981); PA. R.
CraM. P. 305(C)(1)(a); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-14-2(1) (1982); VT. R. CRIM. P. 12.1(a); Wis. R.
CRIM. P. 971.23(8)(a).
2 See, e.g., D.C.R. CRIM. P. 12.1(d); Wis. R. CRIM. P. 971.23(8)(b), (d); infra Appendix.
3 See CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 762-767; D.C.R. CRne. P. 12.1(d); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.200;
HAWAII R. PENAL P. 12.1(e); IDAHO CODE § 19-519(4) (1979); IOWA R. CRaM. P. 10(lld); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 22-3218(1) (1981); LA. CODE CraM. PROC. ANN. art. 727(D) (West 1981); MAss.
R. CRIM. P. 14(b)(1)(D); Miss. UNIFORM Cm. CT. R. 4.07; NEv. REv. STAT. § 174.087(4)
(1981); N.H. Sup. CT. R. 100; N.M.R. CRIM. P. 32(c); N.D.R. CRIM. P. 12.1(c); PA. R. CRM.
P. 305(c)(1); S.C.R. oF PRACTICE IN CIR. CT. 103(e)(4); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-9-4
(1979) (Rule 12.1(d)); TENN. R. CraM. P. 12.1(d); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-14-2(3) (1982); W.
VA. R. CraM. P. 12.1(d); Wyo. R. CRiM. P. 16.1(d). In Vermont, the reporter's notes ap-
pended to the rule indicate that it should be read as excluding the defendant's testimony
from the sanction. VT. R. CraM. P. 12.1 reporter's notes.
4 See, e.g., People v. Merritt, 396 Mich. 67, 83-88, 238 N.W.2d 31, 38-41 (1976); People
v. Rakiec, 289 N.Y. 306, 45 N.E.2d 812 (1942).
35 In Maine, for example, the response to the defendant's violation of the rule is simply
that the court "may take appropriate action." ME. R. CaiM. P. 16A(b).
' See Amz. R. CraM. P. 15.7(b); ARK. R. CriM. P. 19.7(a); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 415(g)(i);
IOWA R. CraM. P. 10(lld); MiNN. R. CraM. P. 9.03 (subd. 8); Miss. UNIFORM CIR. CT. R. 4.07;
Mo. R. CRIM. P. 25.16; N.J.R. CraM. PRAC. 3:11-2; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 250.20(3) (Mc-
Kinney 1982); PA. R. CraM. P. 305(C)(1)(d); R.I.R. CraM. P. 16(i); WASH. R. CraM. P.
4.7(h)(7). In Oklahoma, continuance is the sole sanction. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 585
(West 1969).
-7 See ARiz. R. CRaIM. P. 15.7(c); ARK. R. CRIM. P. 19.7(b); ILL. Sup. CT. R. 415(g)(ii). In
Washington, a contempt sanction appears to be the sole judicially-approved response. State
v. Nelson, 14 Wash. App. 658, 661, 545 P.2d 36, 38 (1975). See infra Appendix.
See infra Appendix; cf. infra notes 136-39 and accompanying text (discussing use of
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II. CHALLENGES TO THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ALIBI NOTICE
RULES AND THE PRECLUSION SANCTION
A. The Constitutionality of Alibi Notice Rules Generally
Alibi notice rules have consistently been upheld against con-
stitutional attack. 9 In Williams v. Florida,40 the Supreme Court
held that Florida's pretrial alibi notice rule41 violated neither the
defendant's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination 42
nor his rights to due process or fundamental fairness.43 The Court
rejected the due process argument summarily, since the notice rule
applied to the prosecution as well as to the defendant." As to the
fifth amendment claim, the Court reasoned that the rule simply
required the defendant to make the same tactical choice he would
otherwise make at trial, a choice between not introducing evidence
at all and introducing it with the attendant danger of revealing the
identity of witnesses and risking the emergence of damaging infor-
mation;4 5 that choice had never been considered a violation of the
privilege against self-incrimination. 0
discretion by trial courts).
39 See Annot., 45 A.L.R.3D 958, 965-74, 47-49 Supp. (1972 & Supp. 1983) (alibi notice
rules upheld in state courts against attacks on several constitutional grounds). The precari-
ous constitutional position of criminal discovery in general, see supra note 3, is reflected in
certain state statutes that explicitly make criminal discovery or alibi notice "subject to con-
stitutional limitations." See, e.g., ARK. R. CRIM. P. 18.3; ILL. SUP. CT. R. 413(d); Mo. R.
CRIM. P. 25.05; WASH. R. CRiM. P. 4.7(b)(2).
40 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
41 Fla. R. Crim. P. 1.200 (1970) (current version at FLA. R. CriM. P. 3.200), quoted in
Williams, 399 U.S. at 104 app. Florida's rule is typical of a number of state rules in that it is
prosecutor-triggered, specifically exempts the defendant's own testimony from exclusion,
specifically states that witnesses whose names and address are not disclosed may be barred
from testifying, provides for a continuing duty to disclose, imposes a reciprocal duty on the
prosecutor, see supra note 8 and accompanying text, and allows waiver of the exclusion
sanction for good cause shown. See infra Appendix.
42 399 U.S. at 82-86.
43 Id. at 81-82; see also Annot., 45 A.L.R.3D 958, 967-68, 47-49 Supp. (1972 & Supp.
1983) (citing state cases which have supported alibi notice statutes on due process or funda-
mental fairness grounds).
44 Williams, 399 U.S. at 81.
45 Id. at 83-84.
41 Id. at 84. The Supreme Court has considered the validity of alibi notice rules in only
one other case since Williams, Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973). In that case, the
Court found the Oregon alibi notice statute, OR. REV. STAT. § 135.875 (currently renumbered
as OR. REV. STAT. § 135.455 (1981)), quoted in Wardius, 412 U.S. at 472 n.3, to be unconsti-
tutional due to its failure to provide reciprocal discovery rights to the defendant. The major-
ity stated that "[i]t is fundamentally unfair to require a defendant to divulge the details of
his own case while at the same time subjecting him to the hazard of surprise concerning
refutation of the very pieces of evidence which he disclosed to the State." Wardius, 412 U.S.
at 476.
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B. The Constitutionality of the Preclusion Sanction
In contrast to the alibi notice rule, the preclusion sanction
that enforces it in most jurisdictions has come under increasing at-
tack in recent years as a violation of a defendant's right to present
a defense. Commentators have asserted that the state's interest in
encouraging truthful alibis and in the efficient administration of
justice does not outweigh the constitutional right of the accused to
defend himself.47 This section will survey the development of the
constitutional attack on the preclusion sanction beginning with the
sanction's early and longstanding acceptance, through the Supreme
Court's recognition of the defendant's right to present a defense,
and culminating in the Seventh Circuit's recent decision striking
down the preclusion sanction in Alicea v. Gagnon.48
1. The Traditional Analysis. State courts have unanimously
rejected constitutional attacks on the preclusion sanction.49 In up-
holding the sanction over arguments that it violates the defen-
dant's rights to call witnesses50 and to testify in his own behalf,51
state courts have primarily adopted a single mode of analysis.
Most state courts have found that the rule does not prohibit alibi
evidence absolutely, but rather places a reasonable procedural con-
dition on the presentation of such evidence,52 a condition that the
47 E.g., Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense: An Emergent Constitutional Guaran-
tee in Criminal Trials, 9 IND. L. REv. 711, 830-41 (1976) (arguing for a test that balances the
state's interest in efficient administration against the defendant's constitutional right and
finding that the government's arguments are not sufficiently compelling to outweigh the
defendant's constitutional right); Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MCH. L.
REV. 71, 137-39 (1974) (discussing the alibi notice rule and arguing that the use of alterna-
tives to the preclusion sanction in enforcing the notice rule is required in light of the history
and recent understanding of the compulsory process clause); Note, supra note 11 (arguing
that the "credibility of the evidence" justification for the preclusion sanction fails in the
face of the construction given the compulsory process clause in Washington v. Texas, 388
U.S. 14 (1967), and that the preclusion sanction constitutes an unconstitutional condition
infringing due process since less drastic means of protecting state interests are available).
48 675 F.2d 913 (7th Cir. 1982).
4' See, e.g., State v. Roberts, 226 Kan. 740, 744, 602 P.2d 1355, 1358 (1979); State v.
Smith, 88 N.M. 541, 543-44, 543 P.2d 834, 836-37 (Ct. App. 1975); Commonwealth v. Vecchi-
ohi, 208 Pa. Super. 483, 489, 224 A.2d 96, 99 (1966); cf. State v. Dodd, 101 Ariz. 234, 237, 418
P.2d 574 (1966) (sanction upheld in face of attack based on state constitutional provisions
identical to compulsory process clause of federal constitution).
50 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 49.
51 See, e.g, State ex rel. Simos v. Burke, 41 Wis. 2d 129, 136-38, 163 N.W.2d 177, 180-81
(1968); see also State v. Wardius, 6 Or. App. 391, 397-98, 487 P.2d 1380, 1383-84 (1971)
(right to testify based on state constitution), rev'd on other grounds, 412 U.S. 470 (1973).
52 See cases cited supra note 49. A few state court decisions endorse the preclusion
sanction as a guarantor of the credibility of alibi evidence, reasoning that any undisclosed
alibi evidence is likely to be untruthful. For example, in State ex rel. Simos v. Burke, 41
Wis. 2d 129, 163 N.W.2d 177 (1968), the Wisconsin Supreme Court reasoned that a defen-
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preclusion sanction enforces. In State v. Smith,53 for example, the
New Mexico Court of Appeals compared alibi notice to condition-
ing the constitutional right to a jury trial on a defendant's timely
request for a jury.54 In neither case, concluded the court, is the
procedural condition antithetical to the constitutional right.55
Only one federal court had addressed the constitutionality of
the preclusion sanction before the Seventh Circuit considered the
issue in Alicea v. Gagnon.6 In Rider v. Crouse,57 the Tenth Circuit
relied on a similar "reasonable condition" rationale to uphold the
sanction. The habeas corpus petitioner in Rider argued that his
constitutional right to testify about his alibi was improperly denied
at his trial .5  The Tenth Circuit rejected that claim, reasoning:
The purpose of a statute like [the Kansas rule] concerning no-
tice of alibi is to prevent a last minute surprise of an alibi
defense. It does not deny an accused the right to such a de-
fense but merely prescribes notice as a prerequisite thereto.
The validity of such statutes is generally upheld. 9
dant presenting a truthful alibi is not harmed by a pretrial notice requirement, seeming to
assume that any alibi raised at trial without prior notice would be untruthful. Id. at 137, 163
N.W.2d at 180-81. An untruthful alibi, the court concluded, is not constitutionally pro-
tected; a defendant's constitutional right to testify extends only to the right to testify truth-
fully, just as other testimony is routinely excluded if immaterial or irrelevant. Id. at 137-38,
163 N.W.2d at 181; see also State v. Flohr, 301 N.W.2d 367, 372 (N.D. 1981) ("The rule...
seeks . . . to insure . . .that presentation of evidence at trial will be fair and reliable.");
State v. Wardius, 6 Or. App. 391, 397-98, 487 P.2d 1380, 1383-84 (1971), (quoting State ex
rel. Simos v. Burke, 41 Wis. 2d at 136-38, 163 N.W.2d at 180-81), rev'd on other grounds,
412 U.S. 470 (1973). Since the Supreme Court's decision in Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S.
14, 19-23 (1967), holding that any a priori state statutory categorization of evidence that
arbitrarily excludes defense witnesses by presuming them to be unworthy of belief violates
the defendant's compulsory process rights, see infra notes 60-67 and accompanying text, the
"credibility of the evidence" rationale for the preclusion sanction has been discredited. See
Note, supra note 11, at 1343-51. Cf. State v. Douglas, 292 Or. 516, 530-33, 641 P.2d 561, 574-
77 (1982) (Lent, J., specially concurring) (criticizing presumption of incompetence accepted
in State v. Wardius, 6 Or. App. at 397-98, 487 P.2d at 1383-84); Note, supra note 11, at
1348-49 (arguing that the doctrine of presumptive untrustworthiness of alibi evidence weak-
ens the adversarial process).
88 N.M. 541, 543 P.2d 834 (Ct. App. 1975).
Id. at 543-44, 543 P.2d at 836-37 (citing Carlile v. Continental Oil Co., 81 N.M. 484,
468 P.2d 885 (Ct. App. 1970), where the court held constitutional a statute conditioning a
defendant's right to a jury trial upon a timely request).
" Smith, 88 N.M. at 543-44, 543 P.2d at 836-37; see also State v. Mai, 294 Or. 269, 274,
656 P.2d 315, 319 (1982) (pretrial disclosure analogous to conditioning witnesses' appear-
ance on issuance of subpoena and payment of witness fee).
56 675 F.2d 913 (7th Cir. 1982).
57 357 F.2d 317 (10th Cir. 1966).
51 Id. at 317.
"' Id. at 318 (citation omitted). General acceptance of the use of a preclusion sanction
as a response to a failure to comply with procedural rules is evidenced by the adoption of
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2. Recognition by the Supreme Court of the Right to Pre-
sent a Defense. In recent years, courts and commentators have be-
gun to question the heretofore generally accepted constitutional
justification for the preclusion sanction as a reasonable condition
on the defendant's presentation of evidence. Those courts and
commentators have premised their attacks on the existence of a
constitutional right to present a defense. Beginning with Washing-
such sanctions in other areas of criminal procedure. Under the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, failure to notify the prosecution of an intention to rely on an insanity defense or
of expert testimony related to the defense can result in the exclusion at trial of the defense
or the testimony of any expert witness on the issue of the defendant's mental state. FED. R.
CRUm. P. 12.2. Federal courts have endorsed this sanction, although it has not been subject
to constitutional challenge. Applications of the sanction have instead been challenged as
abuses of discretion. United States v. Veatch, 647 F.2d 995, 1002-03 (9th Cir. 1981) (failure
to give notice of defense based on mental condition constitutes a waiver of that defense),
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 946 (1982); United States v. Olson, 576 F.2d 1267, 1273 (8th Cir.) (pro
se defense does not excuse compliance with rule 12.2), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 896 (1978);
United States v. Edwards, 90 F.R.D. 391, 397-98 (E.D. Va. 1981) (exclusion not an abuse of
discretion because any other rule would promote the use of 12.2(b) motions solely to gain
continuances).
Criminal discovery orders under rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
may be enforced by the exclusion of the evidence not disclosed. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(2).
Rule 16 preclusion appears to be applied most commonly against the prosecutor. See United
States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d 852, 856-58 (5th Cir. 1979) (not an abuse of discretion for a
trial court to prevent the prosecution from introducting a statement made by defendant in
violation of standing district court order due to government's failure to inform defense
counsel of the statement); United States v. Lewis, 511 F.2d 798, 801-03 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(lower court's inclusion at trial of an oral statement made by the defendant that the govern-
ment did not disclose to the defendant's attorney held an abuse of discretion). The constitu-
tionality of employing a preclusion sanction in response to a defendant's noncompliance is
the subject of controversy. Compare United States v. Davis, 639 F.2d 239, 242-43 (5th Cir.
1981) (holding that sixth amendment right to compulsory process forbids exclusion of evi-
dence solely as a sanction to enforce discovery rules against defendants) and AimicA BAR
ASSOCIATION STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 11-4.7, at 11.67-68 (1980) ("The exclusion
sanction is not recommended because its results are capricious ... [and because] the exclu-
sion of defense evidence raises significant constitutional issues." (footnote omitted)), with
State v. Mai, 294 Or. 269, 276, 656 P.2d 315, 321 (1982) (holding that use of the preclusion
sanction for violation of disclosure requirements under discovery rules does not violate the
sixth amendment right of compulsory process when no effective alternative sanctions are
available). In United States v. Davis, 639 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1981), decided a year before
Alicea, the Fifth Circuit reversed a conviction in part on the ground that the exclusion of
defense witnesses as a sanction for the violation of a pretrial discovery order violated the
defendant's sixth amendment right to compulsory process. The Davis trial court had refused
to admit testimony of defendant's character witnesses because their names had not been
disclosed to the prosecutor before trial, in violation of a discovery order requiring such dis-
closure, and because their testimony would be needlessly cumulative. Id. at 242. The Fifth
Circuit held that the trial court not only abused its discretion in finding no probative value
in the evidence, id. at 243-45, but was also unjustified in unilaterally revoking the right to
present defense witnesses simply as a means to punish the failure to comply with the discov-
ery order, id. at 242-43.
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ton v. Texas,60 the Supreme Court has suggested that such a right
may indeed by found in the fifth,61 sixth, 2 and fourteenth 3
amendments. The right is composed of at least two elements: the
right to call witnesses and the right to testify in one's own defense.
The defendant in Washington challenged a Texas statutory rule64
barring principals, accomplices, and accessories to the same crime
from testifying for each other. The apparent justification for the
rule was that accomplices, because of their inherent interest in the
result, were not credible witnesses.6 5 The Court held that the com-
pulsory process clause not only repudiates the ancient common law
rule barring the defendant from calling witnesses in his favor,6 it
also prohibits "arbitrary" disqualification of any category of wit-
nesses presumed a priori to be untrustworthy.6 7 In 1973 the Su-
preme Court relied on the due process clause to strike down a Mis-
sissippi voucher rule that prevented a defendant from calling
witnesses to impeach the damaging testimony of one of his own
witnesses.68 Justice Powell, writing for the majority, reaffirmed the
principle of compulsory process and construed it as a necessary el-
ement of due process, concluding that "the rights to confront and
cross-examine witnesses and to call witnesses in one's own behalf
have long been recognized as essential to due process. '69
The right of a defendant to testify in his own behalf has yet to
receive such clear endorsement by the Supreme Court. At common
4o 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
"' U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law. .. ").
62 U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to. . .have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. . . ."). In relying
on the compulsory process clause in Washington, the court construed that clause for the
first time in 120 years. See Westen, supra note 47, at 108-11 (discussing the prior Supreme
Court rulings on the compulsory process clause).
'a U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law").
" Tax. STAT. ANN. art 82,711 (Vernon 1925), repealed by Acts of 1965, 59th Leg., ch.
722, at 317, amended by Acts of 1967, 60th Leg., ch. 659, § 21, at 1739 (presently codified at
Tzx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.09 (Vernon 1965)).
Washington, 388 U.S. at 20-21.
"Id. at 19-20.
" Id. at 23; see also Westen, supra note 47, at 111-17 (discussing the case). In the
course of applying the compulsory process clause to the Texas statute at issue in Washing-
ton, the Court also held that that clause is incorporated into the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment and hence applies to the states. 388 U.S. at 17-19.
U Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973). For a discussion of the Supreme
Court's confused analysis in this case of the constitutional bases for a right to present a
defense, see Clinton, supra note 47, at 783-93.
60 410 U.S. at 294.
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law a defendant had no right to testify in his own defense, 0 nor
does the Constitution explicitly provide such a right. Nevertheless,
the federal government and all of the states have created such a
right by statute. 1 Moreover, the Supreme Court has, in dicta, im-
plied support for the notion of the right to testify, not from the
right to compulsory process, but as a fundamental element of due
process.7 2 In Brooks v. Tennessee,3 the Court noted that
"[w]hether the defendant is to testify is an important tactical deci-
sion as well as a matter of constitutional right.' ' 74 In Faretta v.
California,5 the Court listed the right to testify as one of several
constitutional rights "essential to due process of law in a fair ad-
versary process,"76  thus effectively deeming it a fundamental
70 Washington, 388 U.S. at 20; Hammerman, A Criminal Defendant's Constitutional
Right to Testify-The Implications of United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 23 VrLL. L.
REV. 678, 680-82 (1977-78).
71 See, e.g., Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 573-81 (1961) (discussing development of
such competency statutes); 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1982) ("In trial of all persons charged with the
commission of offenses against the United States... the person charged shall, at his own
request, be a competent witness."); Wis. R. EviD. 906.01 (West 1982) ("Every person is com-
petent to be a witness. . . . "); Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 573-81 (1961) (discussing
development of such competency statutes). See also Hammerman, supra note 70, at 682
(discussing the differences between statutory and constitutional guarantees of the right to
testify in one's own behalf, and concluding that the constitutional guarantee is preferable in
that it guarantees a higher standard for waiver of the right); Note, Due Process v. Defense
Counsel's Unilateral Waiver of the Defendant's Right to Testify, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
517, 541-42 (1976) (listing state statues making criminal defendants competent witnesses).
72 See, e.g., In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948) ("A person's right to ... an opportu-
nity to be heard in his defense . . . [is] basic in our system of jurisprudence; and [his]
right[] include[s], as a minimum, a right . . . to offer testimony .... "). See generally,
Clinton, supra note 47, at 756-93. The right to testify can be seen as part of the right to
present a defense. See United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916, 943 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 940 (1963).
Clinton notes that the "right" to present a defense has been derived from different
constitutional sources in different cases. Clinton, supra note 47, at 792-93. See, e.g., Cham-
bers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294-303 (1973) (due process and confrontation clauses);
Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100, 104 (1972) (compulsory process clause); Webb v. Texas,
409 U.S. 95, 98 (1972) (fourteenth amendment due process clause); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406
U.S. 605, 607-13 (1972) (privilege against self-incrimination and right to counsel); Washing-
ton v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17-18 (1967) (compulsory process clause); In re Oliver, 333 U.S.
257, 273 (1948) (due process clauses).
73 406 U.S. 605 (1972).
74 Id. at 612. In Brooks, the Supreme Court held that a Tennessee statute requiring
that a defendant in a criminal proceeding who "desir[es] to testify . . . do so before any
other testimony for the defense is heard by the court trying the case" violates the defen-
dant's privileges against self-incrimination. Id. at 612 (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2403
(1955)). The Court held that the defendant should not be penalized for remaining silent at
the close of the state's case by being excluded from taking the stand later in the trial. Id. at
610.
71 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
76 Id. at 819 n.15.
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right. 7 A number of lower federal and state courts have explicitly
found a constitutional right to testify in one's own behalf.78
3. Alicea: Balancing the State's Interests Against the Defen-
dant's Rights. In Alicea v. Gagnon,79 the Seventh Circuit struck
down Wisconsin's alibi notice rule as a violation of what it held to
be a defendant's constitutional right to testify on his own behalf.
In Alicea, the defendant was tried for armed and masked robbery
in a Wisconsin state court.8 0 At trial Alicea sought to testify that
he was at home on the morning of the robbery.81 Because he had
failed to provide advance notice of the alibi, the court prevented
him from so testifying.8 ' Although Alicea was able to testify that
7 See also Harris v. New York, 401 U.S 222, 225 (1971); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273
(1948).
78 See, e.g., Winters v. Cook, 489 F.2d 174, 179 (5th Cir. 1973) (dicta); United States v.
McCord, 420 F.2d 255, 257 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916, 943-44
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 940 (1963); Poe v. United States, 233 F. Supp. 173, 176
(D.D.C. 1964), aff'd, 352 F.2d 639 (D.C. Cir. 1965). The Ninth Circuit has discussed the
constitutionality of the right to testify in a series of cases without reaching a definite hold-
ing with regard to the source of the right. See, e.g., United States v. Panza, 612 F.2d 432,
438 (9th Cir.) (noting that the right is qualified), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 925 (1980); United
States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1340 (9th Cir. 1977) (cross-examination limits the right);
United States v. Ives, 504 F.2d 935, 941-42 (9th Cir. 1974) (a defendant may expressly or
impliedly waive the right). Most state cases rely on statutory grounds for the right to testify
in one's own behalf. See supra note 71; see also Smetana v. Smith, 22 Ohio L. Abs. 165, 166
(Ct. App.), appeal dismissed, 131 Ohio St. 329, 2 N.E.2d 778 (1936).
79 675 F.2d 913 (7th Cir. 1982).
"0 Id. at 914.
81 Id. at 915.
$2 Id. The Wisconsin statute does not provide specific protection for the defendant's
right to testify. Twenty-four out of the 41 states that have alibi notice rules do specifically
reserve to the defendant the right to testify regarding his alibi. See infra Appendix. The
court specifically refrained from addressing this difference in Wisconsin's alibi notice rules
from the alibi notice rules of other states. Alicea, 675 F.2d at 917 n.6. The decision, there-
fore, has little direct precedential value for those states whose preclusion sanction applies
only to witnesses called by the defendant. Presumably, however, under the Alicea balance
test, the defendant's constitutional right to compulsory process to obtain the testimony of
witnesses would outweigh the state's interest in efficiency, just as the defendant's right to
testify in his own behalf outweighs the state's interest in efficiency, because the cost to the
defendant in terms of potential lost liberty is greater than the administrative benefits to the
state. On the other hand, the Alicea court seemed to suggest that the defendant's own right
to testify might be stronger than his right to call other witnesses because it is the defen-
dant's own freedom which "hangs in the balance" of the trial. Id. at 923. The Supreme
Court's reasoning in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), upholding a defendant's right
to reject court-appointed counsel and conduct his own defense, also suggests that the partic-
ipation of the defendant in the proceedings must be accorded a special weight when the
defendant wishes to participate. Id. at 812-34. Because the right to call witnesses, or "com-
pulsory process," however, is grounded directly in the language of the sixth amendment and
more strongly supported by history, the Alicea balance would likely be struck at least as
deferentially toward the defendant's right to call witnesses as it was in Alicea itself toward
his right to testify.
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he had not left home at the time the crime occurred and to deny
committing the robbery, the jury did not receive instructions con-
cerning an alibi defense and Alicea was convicted."3
In his habeas corpus petition to the Seventh Circuit, Alicea
challenged the constitutionality of the preclusion sanction.8 4 Es-
tablishing a defendant's constitutional right to testify on his own
behalf was crucial to Alicea's case since state habeas corpus peti-
tioners may obtain review in federal court only if they allege the
deprivation of a constitutional right.8 5 After thorough analysis and
review of the precedents,"8 the court concluded that the fifth, sixth,
and fourteenth amendments supported a constitutional right to
testify in one's own behalf.8 7 The court reasoned: "If the search for
truth is to have meaning, surely the most important figure in the
controversy, whose very freedom hangs in the balance, must have a
right to participate directly."88
Having established the constitutional right, the court then
weighed the state's interest supporting the preclusion sanction
against the sanction's effect on the right.8 " The court emphasized
that in balancing federal constitutional rights and state procedural
rules, "the competing state interests must be substantial to over-
come the claims of the defendant."90 Wisconsin asserted interests
83 675 F.2d at 915.
84 Id. at 916.
85 Id. at 920. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (1976) provides the habeas remedy for persons in
custody "in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." Prece-
dents suggest that the error must be of federal constitutional dimension. See, e.g., Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (coerced confession in violation of fifth amendment); Brown v.
Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953) (coerced confession in violation of the fifth amendment); Johnson
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (lack of counsel at trial in violation of sixth amendment). 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1976) provides the conditions of review to be met by a state prisoner
seeking habeas review in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976) provides different conditions
for a federal prisoner seeking comparable post-conviction review in federal court. The con-
stitutional dimensions of a right also have an impact on areas other than habeas corpus
petitions. For example, courts are more likely to impose a lower standard for an effective
waiver of a right that is merely statutory, rather than constitutional. See Hammerman,
supra note 70, at 684-86.
88 In reaching its holding, the Seventh Circuit "partially overruled" an earlier Seventh
Circuit case, Sims v. Lane, 411 F.2d 661, 664 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 943 (1969),
which held that the privilege of the accused to testify is "merely statutory." Alicea, 675 F.2d
at 923. The court reasoned that Sims was "obsolete" because it had been decided before the
Supreme Court's persuasive dicta in Brooks and Faretta. Id. at 921-22; see supra notes 73-
77 and accompanying text (discussing Brooks and Faretta).
87 Alicea, 675 F.2d at 922-23.
88 Id. at 923.
89 Id. at 923-25.
90 Id. at 923 (quoting McMorris v. Israel, 643 F.2d 458, 460-61 (7th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 967 (1982)).
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in preventing false alibis and in facilitating the efficient adminis-
tration of justice. The court held these interests insufficient to de-
feat the defendant's right to testify, finding that the state, with its
superior investigatory power, would rarely be surprised by the
presentation of truthful alibi,91 and that an unsubstantiated alibi,
such as the one Alicea attempted to introduce by his testimony
alone, could hardly hinder the state's prosecutorial efforts given
the prosecution's opportunity to cross-examine or impeach the de-
fendant at trial.92 The court noted that the state could always seek
a continuance for further investigation if the surprise alibi seri-
ously prejudiced its case.9" Having thus found that the state's ih-
terest in precluding the testimony was unsubstantial, and that any
damage to the prosecution through undisclosed testimony was
probably de minimis,94 the court held that the defendant's alibi
testimony could not be precluded.9 5
III. THE PRECLUSION SANCTION AND PROCEDURAL DEFAULT
Alicea balances the value to the state of alibi notice against
the cost to the defendant of losing his right to testify or to present
witnesses to establish an alibi defense. Because the Alicea court
found very few real benefits to the state from the rule, it reasoned
that the cost to the defendant of excluding his testimony out-
weighed these slight benefits."' Yet this analysis seriously miscon-
strues the cost an alibi notice rule imposes on the defendant. If the
defendant complies with the notice rule, he loses only the ability to
' Id. at 924. The court also noted that "[a]s an essential part of its case, the state must
prove a defendant's presence during the commission of an alleged crime, proof which invari-
ably requires pretrial investigation and preparation. Armed with this evidence, the state is
in a formidable position to refute a defendant's unexpected alibi testimony ...... Id. The
court did not, however, address the possibility of a defendant being able to raise a reasona-
ble doubt through such unexpected testimony, see supra note 2, a possibility that might be
reduced if the prosecutor has sufficient warning of the details of the alibi testimony.
" Alicea, 675 F.2d at 924.
93 Id.
" While a response to the Seventh Circuit's analysis is presented infra notes 96-131
and accompanying text, it should be noted here that the Alicea court's finding that the state
interest served by an alibi notice rule is minimal is directly contrary to the Supreme Court's
finding in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 81-82 (1970), that such rules further the search
for truth in criminal trials and the efficient administration of justice.
" Alicea, 675 F.2d at 925-26. Nonetheless, even though Alicea's constitutional right to
testify had been violated, the court noted that the evidence against him was overwhelming.
Moreover, Alicea had been able to introduce certain alibi testimony despite the preclusive
ruling. For these reasons, the court found that the deprivation constituted harmless error
and affirmed the conviction. Id.
90 Alicea, 675 F.2d at 924.
1984]
The University of Chicago Law Review
keep his intention of presenting an alibi defense secret until the
trial itself. It is solely as the result of his failure to comply with
rule that he forfeits his right to present alibi evidence. This Part
will show that the balancing test adopted by the Seventh Circuit in
Alicea,9 7 if carried to its logical conclusion, would condemn as vio-
lative of defendants' constitutional rights not only use of the pre-
clusion sanction for violations of the alibi notice rule, but also a
host of other well-accepted principles of criminal procedure.
A. Procedural Default and Balancing in Other Contexts
To evaluate the Alicea test it is first necessary to recognize the
aspects of procedural default present in alibi notice rules. Proce-
dural default has been defined as the loss of a right through a fail-
ure by an accused or his representative to assert that right in a
prescribed manner or at a required time."' By creating an alibi no-
tice rule, the state dictates when an intention to offer alibi evi-
dence may be announced;99 a defendant's failure to provide notice
at that time operates as a forfeiture of the right to present alibi
testimony, including, in some states, the defendant's own testi-
mony, at trial. The forfeiture operates automatically; no state offi-
cial will ask the defendant why he has not given notice.
A number of considerations justify the deprivation of a consti-
tutional right by procedural default. A defendant and his counsel
necessarily make many tactical decisions in the course of a prose-
cution, including decisions not to assert certain constitutional
rights. It would be far too time-consuming and inefficient to re-
quire judges to inquire specifically into a defendant's understand-
ing of and concurrence in all of those decisions. 00 At the same
97 The Alicea balancing test seems first to have been proposed by the author of a 1972
student note. See Note, supra note 11. This analysis can be applied to any procedural rule
that denies the defendant the ability to exercise a constitutional right based on an earlier
failure to assert the right. See infra note 100.
98 Spritzer, Criminal Waiver, Procedural Default and the Burger Court, 126 U. PENN.
L. REv. 473, 474-77, 513-14 (1978).
: Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 85 (1970).
100 See Spritzer, supra note 98, at 476-77. Procedural default should be distinguished
from waiver, the other principal means by which a defendant is deemed to have foregone a
constitutional right. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), provides the classic definition of
waiver as "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Id.
at 464. Waiver requires an affirmative showing on the record that the defendant knowingly
and voluntarily acquiesced in foregoing the right. See Spritzer, supra note 98, at 475. The
Supreme Court has required an affirmative waiver in a number of contexts, for example, the
right to counsel, see, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938), the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, see, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966),
and the surrender of trial rights by a guilty plea, see, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238,
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time procedures exist for the defendant to assert certain rights at
relatively less cost. Therefore, procedural default furthers effi-
ciency and finality at trial.
The concept of procedural default is integral to at least two
other familiar aspects of criminal procedure: contemporaneous-ob-
jection rules and the rules governing application for a new trial
based on newly-discovered evidence. A defendant is required,
under a contemporaneous-objection rule, to object to the introduc-
tion of inadmissible evidence by the prosecutor or to the use of
improper jury instructions at the time the error is made; if he fails
to object at that time he forfeits the right to object later in the
trial or on appeal.101
A defendant may also lose the opportunity to submit evidence
242 (1969).
The distinction between waiver and procedural default has often been blurred in prac-
tice. Some commentators have used the word "waiver" to include both waiver as defined in
Zerbst and procedural default. See, e.g., Rubin, Toward a General Theory of Waiver, 28
UCLA L. REv. 478, 483-86 (1981); see also Westen, Away from Waiver: A Rationale for the
Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1214, 1214-15
(1977) (discussing the distinction between waiver and forfeiture of constitutional rights).
The term waiver has also been employed to describe the loss of a right through inaction
under a default standard. See Dix, Waiver in Criminal Procedure: A Brief for More Careful
Analysis, 55 Tax. L. REV. 193, 194-204 (1977). For example, Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure creates a procedural default standard for the assertion of several de-
fenses, objections, and requests that are "capable of determination without the trial of the
general issue." FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b). These include defenses and objections based on de-
fects in the institution of the prosecution or in the indictment or information, motions to
suppress evidence, requests for discovery under FED. R. CraM. P. 16, and requests for a
severance of charges or defenses under FED. R. CRIM. P. 14. The reasons for the procedural
default standard of Rule 12 are typical, and include preventing unnecessary trials, deterring
interruption of a trial for any objection relating to the institution and presentation of the
charge, and eliminating from trial disputes over police conduct not immediately relevant to
the question of guilt. See Sewell v. United States, 406 F.2d 1289, 1292 (8th Cir. 1969); FED.
R. CRIM. P. 12 advisory committee note on 1974 Amendment; see also Davis v. United
States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973) (approving preclusion sanction of Rule 12), discussed infra note
116. The rule provides that a failure to raise these defenses, objections, and requests in a
timely manner "shall constitute waiver thereof, but the court for cause shown may grant
relief from the waiver." FED. R. CRim. P. 12(0. The rule misapplies waiver terminology;
forfeiture of a right without a formal review of the defendant's voluntariness and awareness
constitutes procedural default.
101 See, e.g., FED. R. CRim. P. 30 ("No party may assign as error any portion of the
charge or omission therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its
verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection.");
see also Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 124 (1982) (A failure to object contemporaneously to
improper jury instructions causes forfeiture of the objection under Ohio law;, defendant
must demonstrate "cause" for the default to raise the objection under federal habeas
corpus.); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87-90 (1977) (same for failure to object in a
timely fashion to the use of an improperly obtained confession); Henry v. Mississippi, 379
U.S. 443, 448-53 (1965) (same for failure to object to illegally obtained evidence).
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to the fact-finder if he fails to do so at his first trial. Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 33 permits a new trial, at the request of the
defendant, if newly discovered evidence becomes available. 102 Even
after the enactment of the rule, however, courts have continued to
place strict limits on the right to a new trial, applying the test de-
veloped in Berry v. State.103 Berry prohibits new trials unless the
evidence was discovered after the time of the first trial, could not
with "due diligence" have been discovered earlier, is not merely
cumulative or impeaching, and is of such a nature that it will likely
produce an acquittal on retrial.10 4 The second listed factor is the
most important for present purposes: if the defendant fails to use
his best efforts to present his case at the first trial, he forfeits his
right to present a complete defense.105 The similarities among the
alibi notice, contemporaneous-objection, and new-trial rules are
clear: in each case the state requires the defendant to assert cer-
tain of his substantive rights in a manner designed to serve the
efficient, orderly, and fair operation of the criminal justice system.
A failure to comply with the rule may cause a forfeiture of the
right.108 These similarities strongly suggest that an application of
the Alicea test would render the contemporaneous-objection and
102 The court on motion of a defendant may grant a new trial to him if required in the
interest of justice. If trial was by the court without a jury the court on motion of a
defendant for a new trial may vacate the judgment if entered, take additional testi-
mony and direct the entry of a new judgment. A motion for a new trial based on the
ground of newly discovered evidence may be made only before or within two years after
final judgment, but if an appeal is pending the court may grant the motion only on
remand of the case. A motion for a new trial based on any other grounds shall be made
within 7 days after verdict or finding of guilty or within such further time as the court
may fix during the 7-day period.
FED. R. CRIm. P. 33.
103 10 Ga. 511, 527 (1851). For recent cases employing the Berry approach, see, for ex-
ample, United States v. Wright, 625 F.2d 1017, 1019-20 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v.
Pappas, 602 F.2d 131, 133 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 949 (1979); United States v.
Allen, 554 F.2d 398, 403 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 836 (1977). The Berry case actu-
ally stated a six-part test that included the providing of an affidavit from the new witness
himself, and some courts today use a five-part test, see, e.g., United States v. Herman, 614
F.2d 369, 371 (3d Cir. 1980), but there is no significant difference in the substance of any of
the standards. 3 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 557 (1982).
104 Berry v. State, 10 Ga. 511, 527 (1851).
103 See, e.g., United States v. Hedman, 655 F.2d 813, 815 (7th Cir. 1981); United States
v. Rocco, 587 F.2d 144, 146-48 (3rd Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 972 (1979); see also
United States v. Massey, 629 F.2d 1084, 1086 (5th Cir. 1980) (court gave equal weight to
three factors: evidence appears to be merely cumulative, is unlikely to change outcome at
trial and was easily discoverable with due diligence before trial), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 969
(1981).
106 In alibi notice cases, certain mitigating factors, such as those outlined infra notes
136-40 and accompanying text, may establish good cause and prompt a judge in his discre-




Under the Alicea test, the value of contemporaneous-objection
rules to the state would be weighed against the cost to the defen-
dant, not of compliance with the rule, but of the procedural default
resulting from non-compliance.107 Contemporaneous objection per-
mits resolution of issues while the circumstances are fresh in the
minds of the parties and encourages correction by the trial judge of
errors without time-consuming appeals and retrials. 108 A defendant
who neglects to raise an objection at the proper time, however,
may be wrongly convicted on the basis of prejudicial or unreliable
evidence or as a result of improper jury instructions. Weighing
these costs and benefits to a particular party at the time of appeal,
as the Alicea court did, would likely result in the conclusion that
the costs of forfeiture-wrongful conviction-outweigh the value to
the state of the rule itself.
The Berry limitation on new trials serves similar state pur-
poses: it promotes the efficient use of the judicial system's re-
sources by forcing defendants to come forward with their claims
and evidence as early as possible. As a result of that rule, however,
a defendant who, through lack of diligence, fails to find exculpa-
tory evidence in time for use at his first trial may be unable ever to
present that evidence to a factfinder. Under Alicea, that result de-
nies the accused his right to present a defense. Once again, balanc-
ing the state interest served against the loss of that right would
suggest that the Berry rule is insupportable.
B. The Benefits to the State Versus the Defendant's Cost of
Compliance
The flaw in the Alicea reasoning is its implicit assumption
that the benefit to the state of the preclusion sanction must be
weighed against the value of the defendant's constitutional right to
present a defense.109 In fact, the burden imposed by the alibi no-
107 See supra text accompanying notes 89-95.
108 Spritzer, supra note 98, at 477.
1" Professor Clinton balances the same factors, value to the state versus the loss of
defendant's right, to determine whether various procedural and evidentiary rules (including
the alibi notice rule) violate the right to present a defense. Clinton, supra note 47, at 797.
While the application of that test to alibi notice rules is improper for the reasons offered
here, such a standard should be used to judge rules that automatically infringe the defen-
dant's right. Clinton properly employed this balancing test to analyze Washington v. Texas,
388 U.S. 14 (1967), for example. Clinton, supra note 47, at 806-10. In that case the accom-
plice was precluded from testifying at the defendant's trial by the automatic operation of
the evidentiary rule; no effort by the defendant at any time would have permitted him to
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tice rule as enforced by the preclusion sanction is merely the con-
ditioning of that right on compliance with a particular procedure,
not the loss of the right itself. Therefore, the test of the preclusion
sanction's constitutionality is properly stated as a balance between
the value to the state of the notice rule and the cost to the defen-
dant of complying with the rule.
The constitutionality of the preclusion sanction may be as-
sessed by comparing its balance of costs to the defendant and ben-
efits to the state to the similar balancing required in other proce-
dural-default contexts. For example, it is virtually costless for a
defendant to object contemporaneously to errors at trial and
thereby to assert the right to have such errors corrected, while the
benefits to the state are great.110 The balance, therefore, tips heav-
ily in favor of preserving the contemporaneous-objection rule and
the benefits it provides to the state. Similarly, the Berry rule de-
mands an exercise of "due diligence" in gathering evidence for
trial. A defendant who offers at trial evidence resulting from that
diligent effort effectively asserts his right to present his case before
a fact-finder. Any exculpatory evidence that could not have been
found with due diligence may then be offered at a new trial.,1 The
cost of acting with "due diligence" can hardly be burdensome to a
defendant who has already accepted the cost of preparing a de-
fense, and it therefore is outweighed by the savings of the state in
avoiding multiple trials of the same matter.
In the case of alibi notice rules, the costs of compliance are
those involved in preparing an alibi defense before trial and in re-
sponding to the prosecutor's request for such information. None of
the costs of compliance are severe enough to constitute a depriva-
tion of a constitutional right.11 2 The defendant has not failed to
comply with the rule if his information is not complete at the time
overcome the prohibition and redeem his right to compulsory process. For that reason the
existence of the rule necessarily led to a denial of the right, and the balancing of the state's
interest against the value of the right itself was appropriate.
Professor Westen has employed a balancing of the same factors in assessing the consti-
tutionality of conditioning one right on the waiver of another. See Westen, Incredible Di-
lemmas: Conditioning One Constitutional Right on the Forfeiture of Another, 66 IOWA L.
REv. 741, 757-58 (1981) (when the assertion of one constitutional right is conditioned on the
forfeiture of another, a court determining the validity of the condition should assess, for
each right involved, the value to the state of compelling the choice against the defendant's
interest in either right).
110 See generally 2 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE A N PROCEDURE: CRImINAL 2D § 484,
at 698-99 (1982).
"I See generally 3 id. § 557, at 315-40.
211 By giving pretrial notice the defendant does not lose his privilege against self-in-
crimination. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 84 (1970).
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of the request; the continuing duty to disclose imposed by rules
such as Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12.1(c) 113 requires the
release of such information only as it is gathered, whether before
or during trial. By contrast, although the Alicea court gainsaid the
benefits of the alibi notice rule,11 4 other courts and commentators
have noted the increase in administrative efficiency in the trial
process when such a rule is in place. 15 The costs, therefore, of as-
serting an alibi defense are as greatly outweighed by the benefits
gained through avoidance of surprise alibis and the delays they can
cause as the costs of the contemporaneous-objection and Berry
rules are outweighed by their benefits. In sum, treating the preclu-
sion sanction as the result of the defendant's own forfeiture of the
right to present alibi witnesses preserves the benefits alibi notice
rules provide to the state without jeopardizing the defendant's
compulsory-process rights,"6 and hence, by comparison with the
balance of costs and benefits struck with respect to other proce-
dural default rules, should be upheld.
Finally, preclusion is the least severe effective means of secur-
ing the benefits of an alibi notice rule to the state. Commentators
113 See supra note 24.
n, Alicea, 675 F.2d at 924; see supra text accompanying note 96.
5 See, e.g., Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 81-82 (1970); State ex rel. Simos v. Burke,
41 Wis. 2d 129, 136, 163 N.W.2d 177, 180 (1968); Epstein, supra note 2, at 31-32; Flatten &
Watkins, supra note 2, at 13-16.
116 Also analogous to the alibi notice rule preclusion sanction is forfeiture of certain
defenses and objections under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12. The details of the
defenses and objections included in that rule are discussed in the cases cited supra note 100.
If the defendant fails to raise any of these matters before trial, he loses the opportunity to
raise them. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(f). The benefits to the criminal justice system from requir-
ing disposition of these matters before trial include preventing unnecessary trials, deterring
interruption of trials for any objection relating to the institution and presentation of the
charge, and eliminating from trial disputes over police conduct not immediately relevant to
the question of guilt. See supra note 100. If the defendant fails to raise these matters before
trial, the forfeiture mechanism may cause him to lose, inter alia, his right to a legally se-
lected, unbiased grand jury, his right to discovery, and his right to avoid the introduction of
illegally obtained evidence. Once again, under the Alicea test, the loss of these trial rights
outweighs the gain to the system from streamlined trials.
Employing the test this comment suggests dictates the opposite result. Consistent with
the analysis presented here, the Supreme Court has approved the Rule 12 preclusion sanc-
tion. Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973). Justice Rehnquist advanced two argu-
ments in support of the sanction. First, the sanction was firmly rooted in precedent: the
requirement that objections to the composition of a grand jury be raised before trial had
been approved by the Supreme Court in 1883. Id. at 237 (citing United States v. Gale, 109
U.S. 65 (1883)). Second, the value to the criminal justice system of enforcing the rule out-
weighs the tactical value to the defendant of evading the rule's pretrial notice requirement
and of raising various objections at trial, on appeal, or on collateral attack. Id. at 241. Thus
the Court apparently balanced procedural costs and benefits, not procedural benefits versus
the rights forfeited.
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criticizing the preclusion sanction have proposed a number of al-
ternatives.117 These include granting a continuance when a surprise
alibi arises at trial,118 prohibiting further pretrial discovery by the
defendant, 19 permitting the court or prosecutor to comment on
the credibility of alibi evidence presented without prior notice,120
imposing criminal sanctions for a willful failure to comply with the
notice rule, 1 2 and imposing contempt sanctions against the defen-
dant's attorney for a failure to comply. 2 2 Proponents of these al-
ternatives claim that each provides a constitutionally acceptable
means of enforcing alibi notice, and therefore that preclusion is
unnecessary as well as unconstitutional. 2 3
None of these proposed sanctions actually provides an effec-
tive alternative to preclusion. Permitting a continuance for further
investigation as the sole sanction is equivalent to abolishing alibi
notice altogether. 24 Even without an alibi notice rule, a continu-
ance is available to the prosecution when unexpected evidence sur-
faces at trial. 2 5 The threat of a continuance provides no real incen-
tive to the defendant to conform to the rule, and it may even prove
to be attractive as part of a tactical strategy designed to stall the
trial.126 Prohibiting further pretrial discovery for a defendant who
fails to give.alibi notice is also the equivalent of no sanction at all;
the threat of the preclusion sanction does not arise until mid-trial,
well after the opportunity to discontinue discovery is lost. Permit-
ting comment to the jury on the validity of a surprise alibi is of
doubtful constitutionality. 2 7 Criminal sanctions for a willful fail-
117 Clinton, supra note 47, at 833-39; Note, supra note 11, at 1353-54.
218 Clinton, supra note 47, at 835; Note, supra note 11, at 1355, 1357.
11 Note, supra note 11, at 1358.
120 Clinton, supra note 47, at 835; Note, supra note 11, at 1358-59.
' Note, supra note 11, at 1359.
1 Westen, supra note 47, at 138-39; Note, supra note 11, at 1359-60.
Westen, supra note 47, at 138-39; Note, supra note 11, 1364.
12, See Epstein, supra note 2, at 36.
125 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1051 (West Supp. 1984).
126 But see Alicea, 615 F.2d at 924 (arguing that such tactical moves will usually fail
because there will be little surprise and hence no need for a continuance).
M First, such comment may serve to introduce, in a novel fashion, the a priori pre-
sumption of untrustworthiness disallowed in Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22 (1967).
See supra notes 52, 60-68 and accompanying text. Second, comment on a surprise alibi may
violate due process by diminishing the prosecutor's burden of proving guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt. As the Court noted in Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100 (1972), "[b]y creating
an artificial barrier to the consideration of relevant defense testimony putatively credible by
a preponderance of the evidence, the trial judge reduced the level of proof necessary for the
Government to carry its burden." Id. at 104. Finally, this alternative sanction may be analo-
gized to the violation of the privilege against self-incrimination caused by comment on de-




ure to comply with a notice rule would likely provide little incen-
tive to the defendant who already faces considerable punishment
for the principal crime and who believes a surprise alibi provides a
tactical advantage. 1 8 Finally, contempt sanctions against the law-
yer would be at best ineffective, as experience with the Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11129 sanction shows. 130 At worst, contempt
sanctions would create a conflict of interest between the defen-
dant's desire to withhold alibi evidence as long as possible and the
attorney's desire to avoid the sanction. This conflict would give the
defendant an inducement to delay informing his attorney of alibi
evidence in order to avoid having his attorney disclose the evidence
rather than risk contempt. This inhibition impinges on the defen-
dant's interest in the free flow of information to his attorney.1 3 1
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
In framing alibi notice rules, the goal of a state should be to
minimize the costs of compliance while preserving the societal ben-
efits the rule provides. As we have seen, the preclusion sanction is
both constitutional and the least drastic effective means of pre-
serving those benefits. Yet the burden the notice rule imposes on
the defendant may be still further reduced by the adoption of a
version of the rule which includes three elements: prosecutorial ini-
tiation, imposition of a flexible duty of disclosure, and judicial
discretion.
A. Prosecutor-Triggered Rule
Federal Rule 12.1, like the rules in twenty-four states and the
District of Columbia,132 requires the prosecutor to inform a defen-
dant of his duty to provide pre-trial notice of an alibi defense. By
triggering the process, the prosecutor ensures that the defendant's
duty to provide notice, should he wish to present an alibi defense,
is predicated on an awareness of the rule, thereby lowering the cost
of compliance to the defendant. At the same time, since providing
128 The student note recommending this alternative recognized this drawback. Note,
supra note 11, at 1359.
129 FEn. R. Civ. P. 11 (requiring counsel to sign his pleading and attest that "he has
read the pleading ... [and] ... it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by an existing
law or a good faith argument for the extension ... of existing law.")
130 2 MooRE's FeDERAL PRACTiCE at 6 (special alert supp. 1984).
,31 See generally Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Law-
yer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. Rav. 1469, 1470-74 (1966) (discussing im-
portance of confidentiality between attorney and client).
132 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
1984]
The University of Chicago Law Review
notice of the rule is a routine procedure, it does not impose an
undue burden on the prosecutor. 33 As a state's goal should be to
decrease the defendant's cost of compliance with the rule without
diminishing the rule's value to the criminal justice system, it is en-
tirely appropriate for states to adopt a prosecutor-triggered rule.
B. Flexible Duty to Disclose
Permitting the accused to release alibi information as he re-
ceives it, rather than only on a set day before trial, 13 lowers the
cost of compliance by avoiding restrictions on the progress of the
defendant's investigation. It is reasonable for the state to require a
defendant to give notice on a set date of his intention to present an
alibi defense, and to state the place he claims to have been at the
time of the offense. Such disclosure allows the prosecution to de-
velop evidence placing the defendant at the scene of the crime. No-
tification of such details as the names of witnesses, however, can be
provided later without impinging on the state interest in avoiding
surprise alibis, provided that such details are disclosed far enough
in advance of the presentation of the defendant's case to permit
investigation by the state. Indeed, it is in the interest of the defen-
dant to provide such information as early as possible in order to
receive reciprocal disclosure from the prosecutor. 35
C. Judicial Discretion
The defendant's cost of compliance may be increased by an
inability to locate an alibi witness, the inexperience of defense
counsel, or some other unforeseeable event. For that reason it is
proper that every alibi notice rule currently in effect gives the trial
court some discretion in applying the sanction."3 6 Federal courts
consider five factors when determining whether good cause exists
to suspend the preclusion sanction: the amount of prejudice to the
opposing party that resulted from the failure to disclose; the rea-
son for the failure to disclose; the extent to which the harm of the
non-disclosure was mitigated by subsequent events; the weight of
other, properly admitted, evidence for and against the defendant;
133 For example, notice could be attached to or be made a part of the indictment, infor-
mation, bill of particulars, or some other written document ordinarily given by the state to
the defendant during the pretrial period.
18 For an example of such a rule, see FED. R. CuM. P. 12.1(c).
Reciprocal disclosure of alibi defense evidence is required by Wardius v. Oregon, 412
U.S. 470, 475-76 (1973). See supra note 46.
"' See infra Appendix.
[51:254
Alibi Notice Rules
and other factors made relevant by the circumstances of the
case.13
7
While the exercise of judicial discretion depends on the facts
of each case, and while it is impossible to define with precision
acceptable costs to a defendant, two federal cases are illustrative of
the issues involved. One court has held that a defendant's refusal
to disclose his alibi to his court-appointed attorney prior to trial
was not a sufficient reason to avoid the preclusion sanction.' Re-
quiring cooperation with counsel in advance of trial does not place
an undue burden on a defendant, and a contrary rule would give
the defendant an incentive not to cooperate with his attorney in
order to evade the rule. In United States v. Fitts,139 defense coun-
sel's assertion that he was not familiar with the federal alibi notice
rule was held not to suspend the operation of the sanction, since
the prosecutor had demanded alibi witnesses and the rule was
mentioned in writing in the demand. Because in federal practice
the rule is outlined in the prosecutor's request for alibi notice, 14 0
knowledge of the rule-the acquiring of which would otherwise ex-
act a cost of compliance-is available at virtually no cost to the
defense.
CONCLUSION
Alibi notice rules operate to prevent abuses by defendants
presenting alibi defenses and to encourage efficient criminal trials.
The preclusion sanction, which excludes alibi evidence when the
defendant has not given pretrial notice of his intent to make an
alibi defense, is an essential feature of those rules. Nonetheless, the
preclusion sanction has been attacked as an unconstitutional de-
137 See United States v. Portillo, 633 F.2d 1313, 1324 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding no
prejudice where government's undisclosed witness was permitted to testify), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 1043 (1981); United States v. White, 583 F.2d 899, 901-02 (6th Cir. 1978) (no abuse
of discretion where trial court precluded defendant's undisclosed alibi witness from testify-
ing where no good cause for failure to disclose was shown); United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d
1036, 1043 (5th Cir. 1977) (abuse of discretion where trial court permitted government's
unnoticed rebuttal alibi witnesses to testify and the testimony was prejudicial to the defen-
dant). Just as the "due diligence" factor in the Berry test, see supra notes 103-05 and ac-
companying text, is of primary importance in determining the cost to the defendant of dis-
covering evidence prior to trial, the "reason for the failure to disclose" is determinative of
the cost to the defendant of complying with the alibi notice rule. See Taliaferro v. State, 295
Md. 376, 390-98, 456 A.2d 29, 37-41, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2114 (1983); supra note 9; infra
Appendix.
'3 United States v. Barron, 575 F.2d 752, 757-58 (9th Cir. 1978).
13, 576 F.2d 837, 839 (10th Cir. 1978).
140 FED. R. CraM. P. 12.1(a) requires the prosecutor to make written demand upon the
defendant for notice of an alibi defense.
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nial of a defendant's right to present a defense. This comment has
demonstrated that the preclusion sanction is not imposed at the
cost of depriving the defendant of that right, but merely requires
the defendant to assert the right in the approved procedural con-
text before trial. Requiring that notice of the intention to present
an alibi defense be raised before trial does not place undue costs
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Under People v. Rakiec, 289
N.Y. 306, 308-09, 45 N.E.2d
812 (1942), the rule is inter-
preted to protect the defen-
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sion. If the court, in its
discretion, decides to hear
defendant's alibi testimony
without notice, it must, upon
application of prosecution,
grant an adjournment not in
excess of three days.
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ment for state to investigate
the evidence.
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No Yes Yes Court may grant a continu-
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"such other order as the in-
terests of justice require."
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Vt. VT. R. CRiM.
P. 12.1




No Yes The rule is prosecutor trig-
gered, but only applies if
defendant first moves for dis-
covery. Court may order con-
tinuance or more discovery or






No Yes Yes The reporter's notes to the
rule provide for the explicit
protection of the defendant's
testimony from exclusion.
Yes No No The rule is prosecutor-trig-
gered, but only applies if
defendant moves for discov-
ery. If not complied with,
court shall permit discovery








W. W. VA. R.
Va. CRIM. P. 12.1
Wis. Wis. R. CRIM.
P. 971.23(8)
















Yes No No Court may order discovery or
continuance, dismiss action,
or make any order it deems
just; wilful violation may
subject counsel and defen-
dant to appropriate sanctions
by court. See State v. Nel-
son, 14 Wash. App. 658, 661,
545 P.2d 36, 38 (1975) (in
view of the availability of
contempt sanction, and of a
defendant's continuing ability
to "purge" himself by dis-
closing alibi information, pre-
clusion "has not as yet been
applied and may never be").
In 1973, rule 4.7 replaced a
statute that did explicitly al-
low preclusion. See State v.
Grant, 10 Wash. App. 468,
469 n.1, 519 P.2d 261, 262
n.1 (1974).
Yes Yes Yes
No No Yes
Yes Yes Yes
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